At the beginning of the millennium, the Bush administration described the relationship between the U.S. and China as “candid, cooperative and constructive […]” (Ross, Tunsjø & Dong 2020: 29). In a recent article, the U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken described China as an aggressive and revisionist nation (Blinken 2024). How did the relationship between the international hegemon and the (re)rising Middle Kingdom deteriorate so much over the last two decades ? The topic of a potential military confrontation against the People’s Republic of China (P.R.C.) and the United States of America (U.S.) has been one of the main focal points of international relations scholars. This can be easily explained by the fact that China’s economic rise has been perceived as a threat by American leaders and scholars. This state of mind is not only based on fear that China will one day potentially replace the USA as the world hegemon, but also on declarations by many Chinese officials that there is a will to challenge the United States in as many fields as possible, notably high-end manufacturing (Chan 2025). But if this topic is nothing new, current global dynamics put this issue back at the center of international attention. More specifically, the current Trump administration is getting a lot of attention because of its attitude towards China, notably continuing and escalating the trade war the first Trump administration started back in 2018 (The Associated Press, 2018). Other trends like the continuous and escalating pressure inflicted by the P.R.C. on the Republic of China (R.O.C.) to force it into not getting too independent, or even the hundred-year anniversary of the P.R.C. in 2049 (and therefore the promises made by P.R.C. leadership to be accomplished by then, like describing the reunification of China as “inevitable”) all contribute to a global tense climate between the U.S. and the P.R.C. and world-wide (Reuters, 2024). Considering all the elements above, the following question is of primary importance : can the U.S. and China avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific region ?

The Indo-Pacific is a geographic area stretching across both Indian and Pacific oceans. This term is an evolution of the Asia-Pacific, born in the 1960’s (Medalf 2015). Judged too narrow because not including either India or the United-States, the term Indo-Pacific made its appearance in the 2000’s, around the same time the United States operated their “pivot” to the region. The United States now defines themselves as an “Indo-Pacific nation”, sending a clear message to China that it intends to challenge its influence in the region, despite both countries being separated by the world’s largest surface of water (U.S. Department of State). The region, concentrating 65% of the world population and more than 60% of the world’s gross domestic product, has become of prime interest for analysts and leaders of the world (R.O.K. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2022).  

This essay argues that although conflict between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is inevitable because both state’s status (a current hegemon challenged by a rising revisionist power) and interests (like the future of the R.O.C., global economic domination or the current world order) don’t align. But this conflict can (and should) stay limited to the economic sector. Both countries can avoid triggering direct armed conflict by acknowledging that it will both harm them and the Indo-Pacific region more than it would benefit them. Furthermore, considering that both countries possess nuclear weapons, nuclear deterrence and mutually assured destruction should ensure that no global-scale conflict should start between both states.

Literature about a potential Chinese-U.S. confrontation is abundant. The most fundamental works about the topic are Shirk’s China, fragile superpower (Oxford University Press, 2007), Doshi’s Avoiding War with China (University of Virginia Press, 2021) and of course Allison’s Destined for War (Mariner Books, 2018). If these books offer relevant insights and new leads to explore the U.S.-P.R.C. rivalry, it is important to note that all these publications are written by American scholars and published in the U.S. This leaves international relations scholars and students with a significant blind spot : how can we accurately describe and predict the evolution of the rivalry if we only read about it from one perspective ? This imbalance has many causes, mostly the language and access barriers caused by the control operated by the Chinese Communist Party on academic publications in China. We can also suppose it has to do with the fact that China, being the underdog, does not want to reveal its strategy when confronting the United States. Rather than publications or journal articles, China operates by statements made by party officials.

Although the literature about the topic is plentiful, this essay runs into some limitations. It tries to cover an unprecedented state of international relations. International relations scholars base themselves on past events to analyze today’s and tomorrow’s dynamics. The main historical examples used by said scholars are the decade-long confrontation between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, or the confrontation between Athens and Sparta in ancient Greece. Therefore, it is difficult to approach such a unique situation with events not totally corresponding to today’s state of affairs. Although the “Thucydides trap” concept was updated by Graham Allison in his eminent work Destined for war (2018), scholars still lack theoretical frameworks that accommodate all current traits of the confrontation between the United States and China, most notably the influence of the second Trump administration. Finally, it has been difficult to track the announcements and decisions made by the Trump administration as it keeps publishing contradicting or plain false declarations.

To fully encompass the stakes of this topic, this essay will first briefly go over the history of U.S.-China relations. Subsequently, after analyzing how current tensions in the relationship might lead to conflict if not assessed properly, this essay will try to go over certain measures that both leaderships can undertake in order to avoid armed conflict in the Indo-Pacific region and give future outlooks.

A brief history of U.S.-China relations

Like all states, China’s current behavior is shaped by its past. Although Chinese history spans across millennials, it is possible to narrow down three main historical dynamics that still deeply influence Chinese foreign policy today.

First, the heritage of the Qing dynasty is still very influential in today’s Chinese political landscape (Shambaugh 2020). Moreover, it has led to an immense cultural pride amongst Chinese people, which in turn gives birth to a sense of exceptionalism compared to other regional powers (ibid). Furthermore, some institutions like the hukou (户口), which is a housing system used in the P.R.C. and the R.O.C., are directly derived from the empire. The second historical trend shaping Chinese foreign policy is the fact that China has been ruled by authoritarianism for a century. The existence of such a strong state and the domestic behavior of such a state (oppresses its own population, treats minorities in a very harsh way, etc.) shows regional partners that China is unlikely to work fairly and promptly with them to settle bilateral or multilateral matters (ibid). Finally, the third historical dynamic shaping Chinese foreign policy is the so-called “century of humiliation”, stretching from 1839 to 1949. This century is instrumentalized by the C.C.P. to justify a strong state today, implying it is necessary to take authoritarian measures to clear China’s name of this affront. These three historical dynamics should be considered when studying U.S.-China relations. Generally, these relations have been quite peaceful. Although the United States first recognized Chiang Kai-shek’s China as the main representative of the country, this changed in the 1970’s. Following the unfolding of the so-called “ping-pong diplomacy,” President Richard Nixon made the first official American visit to China in 1972. This turn of events was of course greatly influenced by the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960’s, drawing both communist countries away from each other. Formal ties and a formal “One China Policy” were then finalized in the following years of Nixon’s visit (1979). After Mao’s death in 1976, the economic reforms (known as the 4 Modernizations) pursued by Deng Xiaoping in the 1980’s and 1990’s propelled China’s economy to the point where it became the world’s second largest economy in 2010 (Council on Foreign Relations). But relations became more tense as the United States operated its “pivot” to Asia in 2011 under the Obama administration. The United States became increasingly critical of Chinese behavior in the region, notably calling out the regular military pressure put on Taiwan as well as its illegal expansion in the South China Sea (BBC News, 2015). But U.S.-China relations came at an all-time low in recent months as President Trump decided to unilaterally wage a trade war with the world’s second-largest economy. In an unprecedented episode, both Chinese and American officials each augmented tariffs in response to the opposing party raising their own, leading to unimaginable numbers like a 145% trade tariff on all Chinese goods (Minsberg, 2025).

Current escalation of relations and regional consequences

Current relations have deteriorated to a point where both governments are openly attacking each other. These tensions are mainly based on two concurring events : the trade war launched by the Trump administration in February 2025 against all its trading partners and the escalation of the P.R.C. 's pressure on Taiwan.

As Donald Trump entered the White House in January 2025, he stated during his first international speech that trade partners, no matter if considered historical allies or not, would receive trade tariffs based on the trade surplus they share with the United States (Al Jazeera, 2025). He argued that trade partners were taking advantage of the United States, using their trade deficit as an advantage to grow their economy : “They’ve allowed other nations to take advantage of the US. We can’t allow that to happen anymore” Trump said during his speech at the 2025 Davos World Economic Forum (ibid). Although allies were used to Donald Trump saying things without really following up with actions, they were deceived. The following month, Trump signed three executive orders (EO 14193, EO 14194 and EO 19195) imposing a 25% trade tariff on all Canadian and Mexican goods, and more notably a 10% tariff on all Chinese goods. But the trading war escalated to another level on April 2^nd, 2025 (so-called “Liberation Day” by the Trump administration), when Trump personally announced a baseline 10% tariff, on top of which another one will be added for the countries having the highest trade deficits with the United States (CNN, 2025). Trump's transactional attitude has created distrust amongst allies (mostly in Europe) and alienated a lot of adversaries of the U.S., notably China. But Trump realized that his actions would have irreversible consequences not only on the American but on the global economy, which is why he decided to roll back tariffs and hold bilateral discussions with China to come to an agreement on common trade policies. The latest developments showed positive signs of a truce between both economic giants (Reuters, 2025). But the U.S. will still impose a general tariff of 55% on Chinese goods, impacting a little over $660 billion in annual trade between both countries (AP News, 2025). Going forward, it is difficult to predict how trade relations between both countries will evolve, as President Trump is famous for having an “out of the box” political agenda. Another more predictable issue however is the state of cross-strait relations and its impact on U.S.-China relations.

In 2024, Taiwan re-elected a president for the first time since holding its first democratic elections back in 1996. The Taiwanese confirmed their choice to keep Lai Ching-te in office, comforting the position of the Democratic Progressive Party (D.P.P.). This electoral result reflects the general climate in Taiwan according to which people identify themselves more and more as being Taiwanese rather than Chinese. The Pew Research Center reported that 67% of the Taiwanese population identify as only Taiwanese, 28% believe they are both Chinese and Taiwanese, and only 3% believe they are entirely Chinese (Mooradian, 2024). This poll highlights the failure of the Chinese leadership to properly convince Taiwanese people that reunification is a necessity. In response, the C.C.P. tried to pressure the D.P.P. via diplomatic and economic channels, without success (ibid). Regarding Taiwan, the United States has adopted a position known as strategic ambiguity. This means that the United States, despite numerous legal documents (Taiwan Relations Act, Six Assurances), has always intentionally stayed ambivalent about whether it would intervene in the case of a Chinese invasion of Taiwan or not. For decades, this position forced the P.R.C. to tone down its aggressive behavior, while the U.S. regularly sent parts of its 7^th fleet across the strait as to deter any attempt by the P.R.C. Despite this, the P.R.C. remains adamant to take control back over Taiwan. In recent years, it has ramped up military spending, particularly investing in its navy (CSIS, 2024).

But although both superpowers have shown signs of emerging conflict, there should be no need to worry about it turning into an armed conventional conflict. Many elements argue in favor of a peaceful future (at least militarily) in the Indo-Pacific.

Regional safeguards for a peaceful future in the Indo-Pacific 

When two major powers clash, there is often a fear that this opposition might spill over to other smaller countries and allies in the region or world-wide, given the influence the two major powers have over the region and the global economy. In the case of the rivalry opposing the United States and China, there are a few elements that should reassure current leaders of smaller countries that the two biggest economies in the world will not engage in military conflict with each other. Although many of these arguments ground themselves in the historical example of the Cold War, they are still relevant to contemporary challenges. But despite these safeguards, American and Chinese leaders have a number of options at their disposal to strengthen the relationship between both countries and further avert the spectre of war.

The frameworks used during the Cold War to support that both superpowers would not clash still apply today in part because China like the U.S.S.R. possess nuclear weapons. Therefore, the main argument in favor of a peaceful future for the Indo-Pacific is that both superpowers, having the capacity to inflict unacceptable damage to the other, will not engage in direct military confrontation. Despite the significant gap in the nuclear weapons arsenal between both countries, (China counting about 500 nuclear warheads compared to the U.S.’s 5.044 warheads), China is still very credible as a nuclear power (SIPRI, 2024). While direct confrontation remains unlikely, proxy confrontation is still to be a major issue. As history shows, both countries are not reluctant to use their regional partners as buffers or proxies to push their regional agenda. Countries like South Korea, Japan, Vietnam or more recently Russia all have strong ties with either economic superpower and are likely to have bad relations with the other. But although some regional actors fear these proxy wars as a real and imminent threat, one could make the argument that the regional dynamics of power currently prevent such a thing (ASPI, 2023). First of all, new regional institutions like ASEAN, APEC and the Quad allow for better communication between regional partners, therefore making it unlikely that a major power will resort to using force. Second, as stated above, the Indo-Pacific carries unimaginable economic and strategic weight, therefore making an armed intervention (proxy or not) very unlikely. Global supply chains would be disrupted, and the global economy would go into an unprecedented recession. This, along with mutually assured destruction by nuclear weapons, makes any kind of armed conflict unlikely. However, new tactics like grey-zone warfare have already been put in action as a replacement to direct confrontation. But these tactics offer a lower-scale impact than global regional warfare. Although many arguments support a relatively peaceful future for the Indo-Pacific, leaders of America and China still have a lot of work to do to completely dissuade the other from disrupting the regional order.

Solutions for American and Chinese leaderships

The region’s future stability ultimately hinges on the strategic decisions of the United States and China. Both nations must acknowledge that rivalry alone cannot dictate the region’s trajectory; initiative-taking leadership and sustained commitment to conflict prevention are essential.

To reinforce regional security, U.S. and Chinese leaders should begin by institutionalizing direct military-to-military communication, particularly in areas prone to tension, such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. Regular defense dialogues and the establishment of crisis communication channels can reduce the risk of misperception or accidental escalation. Just as importantly, both sides should commit to greater transparency in military operations—such as prior notification of large-scale exercises, the establishment of maritime “rules of the road,” and mutual restraint in high-risk areas. In parallel, Washington and Beijing should engage in joint efforts to address non-traditional security challenges that transcend geopolitical competition. Areas like climate resilience, disaster relief, counter-piracy, and pandemic preparedness provide practical avenues for cooperation that build trust and highlight shared interests. Confidence-building measures in these domains can help soften the zero-sum logic of great power rivalry. Moreover, both countries must work to strengthen, not bypass, regional institutions. The credibility and effectiveness of platforms like ASEAN depend on the support of major powers. Rather than forcing Indo-Pacific countries to choose sides through exclusive trade agreements or security coalitions, the U.S. and China should endorse inclusive mechanisms like the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), promoting rules-based engagement over coercive diplomacy. Supporting ASEAN-led conflict resolution processes and regional dialogue forums can further institutionalize peaceful dispute settlement. For example, during the latest ASEAN summit that took place in May 2025, the Philippines pushed for a legally binding common agreement on a code of conduct on the South China Sea in order to frame and limit the issues in the region (ABS-CBN News, 2025). 

In sum, peace in the Indo-Pacific is attainable, but it requires conscious effort. Through consistent diplomacy, mutual restraint, and multilateral engagement, U.S. and Chinese leaders can help construct a stable regional order that accommodates competition while averting confrontation.

Conclusion

Conclusively, the U.S.-China rivalry in the Indo-Pacific is undoubtedly one of the defining dynamics of 21st-century international relations. As this essay has argued, the deteriorating relationship between these two powers is rooted in structural factors: an incumbent hegemon facing the rise of a revisionist challenger, divergent strategic interests in the region, and domestic political pressures on both sides. The renewed assertiveness of China, especially regarding Taiwan, and the increasingly adversarial posture of the United States—exacerbated by the return of the Trump administration and its aggressive trade policy—have significantly raised tensions. However, while friction may be inevitable, escalation to military conflict is not. On the contrary, several stabilizing factors point to a future where confrontation remains bound within economic and diplomatic arenas. The presence of nuclear deterrence, the economic interdependence of both countries, and the growing role of regional institutions collectively function as guardrails against a full-scale war.

Nonetheless, avoiding armed conflict is not a passive process. It requires deliberate and sustained efforts by both Beijing and Washington to manage competition responsibly. As outlined in this essay, enhancing direct communication channels—particularly military-to-military hotlines and crisis management protocols—is a crucial first step. Such mechanisms are vital to reducing the risk of misperceptions and accidental escalation, especially in sensitive flashpoints like the Taiwan Strait or the South China Sea. In addition, both powers should broaden their engagement in cooperative initiatives on non-traditional security threats, such as climate change, public health, and maritime safety. These forms of low-stakes collaboration can foster trust and reinforce a norm of coexistence despite strategic rivalry.

Moreover, the United States and China must avoid framing the Indo-Pacific as a zero-sum geopolitical battlefield. Encouraging regional multilateralism, respecting ASEAN neutrality, and supporting inclusive economic platforms like the RCEP and IPEF can prevent the hardening of bloc politics that might otherwise fuel proxy confrontations. While grey-zone tactics and information warfare remain challenges, these are far preferable to open hostilities and can be mitigated through transparent norms and digital diplomacy.

All in all, conflict in the Indo-Pacific is not preordained. With careful diplomacy, institutional support, and a shared recognition of mutual vulnerability, the United States and China can shape a regional order marked by competitive coexistence rather than destructive confrontation. Peace is possible—but only if it is actively pursued.

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